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apostle Paul’s struggle: “For I do not do what I want, but I do the very 
thing I hate” (Romans 7:15). A deep Augustinian conviction is that we are 
in bondage to sin, and so not able to trust and love God unless God elects 
us and gives us the gift of faith, something God does not do for everyone. 
Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and many other leading theologians 
believe sinners are called to faith and love, but are not able to fulfill this 
calling without selectively given divine help.
This book does what it sets out to do, constructing a fruitful and use-
ful model for Christian thinking. One of the valuable contributions of 
this book is the way it draws together central claims and insights of “Re-
formed epistemology” while placing them in a broader theological and 
intellectual context. Stackhouse uses postmodern sources well, learning 
from them without accepting the relativism and skepticism so often af-
firmed by postmodernists. The book synthesizes so many complex issues 
and sources that it falls short of the more thorough treatment one might 
want on fewer topics. But it does make many stimulating proposals that 
will reward further work. 
Socrates and the Gods: How to Read Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, by 
Nalin Ranasinghe. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2012. 256 pages. 
$28.00 (hardcover).
DOUGLAS V. HENRY, Great Texts Program, Baylor University
Books abound explaining how to read Plato’s dialogues. By way of sub-
title, Nalin Ranasinghe self-identifies his contribution within this niche. 
Yet unlike the others, Socrates and the Gods says far less than it shows about 
how to read the dialogues dramatizing Socrates’s final weeks. That is, 
Ranasinghe devotes far less attention to self-conscious reflection on meth-
odology than he does to practicing a method. Therein are bound together 
the book’s central strengths as well as a besetting weakness.
Ranasinghe’s interpretive method defies easy characterization. Partly 
this is due to the “proudly autochthonous” quality of the book (2). Fur-
ther complicating matters is his “seemingly cavalier disregard of three 
and twenty centuries” of scholarship concerning the Euthyphro, Apology, 
and Crito (2). But even apart from these idiosyncracies, he simply fails to 
indicate straightforwardly his methodological commitments, an omission 
reflecting a pervasive rhetorical style given to enthymematic argument. In 
consequence, readers must work hard to identify his hermeneutic, his con-
clusions, and his reasons for them. While these deficits constitute frustrat-
ing liabilities for a “how to” book, no less is it the case that Ranasinghe’s 
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interpretations of classical Greek epic, drama, philosophy, politics, and re-
ligion are generative and illuminating. It turns out that there is a plausible 
methodos to his peculiar mania, so that he says well, “Any merits that this 
eccentric work may possess accrue from its fanatical loyalty to Socrates 
and Plato” (2).
Generally speaking, Ranasinghe reads classical texts with attention to 
(1) historical-cultural context, (2) dramatic plot, (3) typological signifi-
cance, and (4) philosophical and psychological insight. Whether discuss-
ing Homer, Aeschylus, Plato, or Xenophon, Ranasinghe demonstrates 
literary-critical acumen and interpretive generosity. Regarding the three 
Platonic dialogues he treats, he operates with at least four additional her-
meneutical principles. First, the Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito comprise a 
dramatically consistent oeuvre. They form an “essential literary unity” (3) 
and convey a “tragic-comic theme unifying and animating the three dia-
logues in question” (201). Second, whatever the historicity of Euthyphro, 
Meletus, and Crito, Plato’s dramatization of the men matters more their 
history. Ranasinghe argues that the etymological significance of the three 
names dovetails so neatly with the thematic emphases of the dialogues that 
we ought to regard them as “more fictional than real” (16). The character 
Euthyphro, whose name suggests “straight thinking” or “direct knowl-
edge,” is a Homeric theological literalist who claims immediate apprehen-
sion of the divine, but Socrates demonstrates his failures on both counts. 
Meletus, Socrates’s accuser in the Apology, “whose very name means ‘care’ 
. . . couldn’t care less whether Socrates was actually atheist, agnostic or 
heretic” (83–84). And Crito’s name suggests “discernment or judging” 
(175). Yet “just as Meletus failed to care and Euthyphro’s eponymous lit-
eralism was utterly inadequate to the task of understanding the divine, 
Crito proves to lack the very quality that his name denotes” (176). Third, 
Ranasinghe precisely identifies the most powerful interpretive fulcrum 
within the dialogues: “the self-revelation of the interlocutor(s) . . . is the 
key to deciphering the secrets of the text” (179). By descrying an interlocu-
tor’s true character—a task entailing considerations of cultural context, 
dramatic plot structure, and rhetorical criticism as much as philosophical 
analysis—one can “discover a dialogue’s concealed but ever-suggestive 
phusis” (191). Finally, Ranasinghe adopts the Republic as a Platonic “proof 
text” (226) for his interpretive judgments. Why the Republic deserves the 
definitive status he assigns it goes unaddressed. That said, if Ranasinghe 
rightly holds that Plato’s dialogues unfold “in a perfected cosmos micro-
managed by its imperfect creator—a place where accidents never occur 
and every detail has meaning” (17), then it follows that every reading of 
any particular Platonic dialogue is susceptible to interpretive correction 
from all of the other dialogues. And if that is so, since the Republic has the 
advantages of length and familiarity, it is perhaps a “best case” test case. 
Of course the larger point, the one elevating Plato’s work to something 
akin to the Bible as understood by Christians with a plenary and verbal 
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theory of divine inspiration, is arguable, to put it mildly, notwithstanding 
Alan Bloom’s popularization of the view.
Substantively, the book foregrounds the oft-neglected subject of politi-
cal theology. On Ranasinghe’s reading, the three dialogues highlight dif-
ferent aspects of fifth- and fourth-century Athenians’ understanding of the 
gods and the concomitant politics associated with those understandings. 
Because the “vitality of the religious tradition . . . [had] broken down . . . 
the war-chastened Athenians were no longer conscious of dwelling in a 
god-hallowed cosmos” (41). Into this theologically and politically disen-
chanted space, Plato’s dialogues enter.
The Euthyphro and Apology present their antagonists in superficially 
similar dramatic circumstances: Euthyphro and Meletus are both pros-
ecuting older men for impiety. Their theological and political interests, 
however, radically diverge. Euthyphro’s literalism blithely accepts “the 
hoary old myths as exact factual accounts of the history of Olympus” (36) 
without caring at all about hermeutical issues, crass anthropomorphism, 
or moral inconsistency. Socrates enjoys no evident success in shaking 
Euthyphro’s “fundamentalist” tendencies. Perhaps this is because, since 
soothsayers like him have ostensibly unmediated access to the divine, 
Euthyphro revels in the presumed supremacy of priestly direction in po-
litical matters. His fundamentalism is motivated, one might say. Meletus, 
by contrast, demonstrates no apparent interest in philosophical or theo-
logical reflection; Socrates’s cross-examination in the Apology shows him 
up as a fool where knowledge of the divine is concerned. Yet Meletus 
cares a great deal about politics, and he’s no fool about the advantages 
of traditional religion when it comes to preserving entrenched political 
interests. Socrates’s alleged impiety matters to Meletus just insofar as it 
is connected to his alleged corruption of the youth, a “corruption” that 
threatens to overturn the city’s status quo. On Ranasinghe’s reading, re-
ligious Euthyphro succumbs to hubris and political Meletus falls prey 
to premeditated hypocrisy. Both serve their own advantage and neither 
gives way to Socrates’s philosophically enlightened political theology. 
Ranasinghe writes:
Through his inspired oracles and wise exegeses, Euthyphro offers to re-
create meaning in a god-impoverished world. He is unwilling to acknowl-
edge the far weaker pragmatic effective position of Meletus that telling 
stories about the gods and performing public sacrifices revives and unifies 
the polity. If either Meletus or Euthyphro is correct, politics and revelation 
cannot exist together. It is Socrates who will tacitly suggest a manner in 
which mankind’s sacred and secular obligations . . . may be reconciled to 
each other by a gift of the gods: the Hermes-given faculty of judgment. (42)
At this point Ranasinghe’s interpretive methodology begins to pay 
off. At the heart of Socratic theology, he maintains, is an answer to the 
question posed at Euthyphro 10a: “Is that which is holy loved by the gods 
because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?” The reason-
able Socratic answer—the historically, dramatically, and philosophically 
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fitting answer—embraces the first disjunct. Socratic theology accepts the 
view that the gods discover and serve what is holy. And if holiness is a 
cosmic reality, not a crude voluntaristic creation, then it and its moral con-
comitants may be both rationally examined and erotically pursued. We 
possess, at least potentially, the power of judgment whereby we may see, 
desire, seek, revere, and finally embrace what is holy. Socrates’s theology 
thus avoids Euthyphro’s naive acceptance of the Homeric and Hesiodic 
myths, unquestioning promulgation of dubious morals, and obfuscation 
before rational challenge. It likewise resists Meletus’s carelessness about 
divine matters, for Socrates takes belief in the gods, the excellence of one’s 
soul, and the longing for holiness as preeminently important, rather than 
as merely politically useful desiderata convenient for sustaining public 
order and civic life. Socrates’s theology thus overcomes “the divisive to-
tems of fundamentalism and the moral chaos born of liberal positivism” 
and “points towards the possiblity of a universal religion—one based on 
the idea of Goodness, the practice of virtue, and the finding of grace and 
beauty in the cosmos” (51).
The Crito, Ranasinghe argues, fits on the far side of the Apology in the 
same way the Euthyphro fits on the near side. Both explore the implied 
arguments underlying Socrates’s actions in the Apology; the former ad-
dresses his theology, the latter his politics. Ranasinghe proposes:
[J]ust as the Euthyphro defends the “goodness” of the strange gods he is 
accused of exposing the young to, the Crito suggests how the corruption 
of their fathers could be redeemed. While the Euthyphro explains how the 
polity is corrupted by a bad connection between the divine and human, and 
the Apology reveals some of the sacred powers impeding the prospect of 
transcendence, the Crito subtly indicates what a Socratic political solution to 
these moral and political problems would look like. (175)
Crito, although among Socrates’s closest personal friends, fails to judge 
well. Mired in self-preoccupation, he beleaguers Socrates, pressing him 
with concerns about public reputation, family honor, money, and the like, 
and he fails to take seriously enough the philosophical convictions which 
guide Socrates’s practices and actions. As shown in both the Crito and the 
Euthydemus, Crito is “sensitive to the contagion of shame” and echoes “the 
opinions expressed by men for whose opinions he has no small regard, 
even though he knows them to be ignorant” (192). Yet Socrates does not 
lose patience with or show contempt for Crito. He rather exemplies true 
friendship and politics alike, which are characterized by “good men who 
help bring out the best in each other, rather than being only about preserv-
ing the comfortable and private in a world gone mad” (196). In the face of 
death, Socrates’s political practice—his soulcraft and statecraft—coheres 
with his theology; his philosophically tested political theology shows 
Crito, and all who would exercise rational judgment, a better way.
Socrates and the Gods possesses many merits. It is above all a fecund 
book, brimming with potential. Virtually every page contains suggestive 
avenues of inquiry, comparison, and contrast. For instance, Ranasinghe’s 
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treatment of Socrates as a new kind of hero to which Achilles and Odysseus 
serve as foils is beautifully executed and rewarding to read. Similarly, his 
exploration of the polyvalent significance of Crito arriving to find Socrates 
asleep is meritorious. The book’s fecundity, however, frequently is like an 
overflowing cornucopia; too often missing is a measured, deliberative, 
and dare I say scholarly enjoyment of the bounty. Another excellence con-
sists in the book’s occasional references to contemporary circumstances: 
“Socrates’s feat is of no little significance in our own day” (219). Ranas-
inghe is certainly correct. Yet here, he takes regrettable recourse in glib 
labels and drive-by diagnoses—“postmodern man,” the “deified market,” 
“religious anti-humanism,” and “atheistic science” are cavalierly bandied 
about where critical precision, sobriety of judgment, and provocative argu-
ment are necessary.
The book’s rhetorical qualities matter less than its methodology and 
substance, yet I must add a few comments about style. Socrates and the 
Gods would have benefited from a strong editorial hand. Clearer initial 
statements of argument and periodic rehearsals of arguments are needed. 
Simple divisions and subheadings within the chapters are lacking. Trunca-
tion of undisciplined prose would help. Perhaps most all, much refinement 
is needed of the untold allusions found in the book. Classical allusions 
to Homer, fifth-century tragedians, and philosophical texts are fine and 
useful. Shakespearean turns of phrase are occasionally decorous, if self-
indulgent. But Abraham Lincoln (“fool some of the people all of the time”), 
Dale Carnegie (“win friends and influence people”), and John Gillespie 
Magee (“escape the surly bonds of earth”)? The book’s anachronistic al-
lusions quickly become wearyingly trite. More bothersome are periodic 
Christian allusions which too conveniently assimilate Socrates to Christ.
Plainly, Socrates and the Gods is too autochthonous to displace standard 
scholarly treatments of the Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito. Yet because 
Ranasinghe idiosyncratically neglects the scholarly literature, he has a free 
hand to develop a novel, perceptive, and striking interpretation. Thus is it 
that, despite real limits, Socrates and the Gods can offer great gifts to dialec-
tically engaged readers.
Evolutionary Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 174 pages. $29.95 (paperback).
VERONIKA WEIDNER, University of Munich
Either some form of traditional religion or no religion at all—these seem to 
be the only two alternatives on offer today. But maybe this impression is 
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